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8.1 Introduction 
Classic literature on organizations recognizes that the paramount function 
of an organization is the coordination of physical and human assets to 
produce a good or service (e.g., Barnard, 1938; Chisholm, 1989; Schein, 
1985). Coordination in this early literatore was defined broadly, as for exam-
ple by Mooney (1947, p. 5): "Coordination therefore, is the orderly arrange-
ment of group effort, to provide unity of action in the pursuit of a common 
purpose." Mooney argues further that coordination is the first principle of 
organization and that any other organizational principles "are simply prin-
ciples through which coordination operates and thus becomes effective" 
(p. 5). The landmark work of Thompson (1967) distinguished kinds of 
interdependence that give rise to coordination problems and ways in 
which coordination might occur - for example, by standardization, plan-
ning, or mutoal adjustment. Coordination also plays a central role in recent 
thinking about the economics of internal organization (Becker & Murphy, 
1992; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992), the history of business organization 
(Lamoreaux & Raff, 1995, esp. p. 5), core competencies in business strategy, 
mutualism and legitimation in organizational evolution, macroeconomics 
(Cooper & John, 1988), and other fields. 
The need for coordination arises if the organization's success depends 
on the decisions made by each of a group of actors, and the decisions 
interact in determining success. In the traditional sense, a coordination prob-
lem exists if achievement of a particular organizational goal requires that 
each actor select the appropriate action, and the goal is not fully achieved if 
all members of the group do not select goal-fulfilling actions. 
We' thank partidpants in seminars at the Chicago GSB Behavioral Science workshop, the 
UCLA Policy and Organization workshop, the 1995 Academy of Management meetings, Don 
Kleinmuntz, Roy Radner, and Zur Shapira for comments and ideas. 
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. Toillustrate coordination problems, it may help to first imagine an orga-
ruzation that does not reqUITe much coordination. Picture a room full of 
equally skilled workers who draw similar garment pieces from a central bin 
and sew them together. If the sewing is simple enough then the "organi-
~ation's" total output is just the sum of each worker's oU4>ut, and coordina-
tion of work~rs' efforts is not important. Extending the example shows 
~ow likely It IS that coordination really is important. If the garments differ 
m compleXltyand workers differ in skill, then assigning hard work to the 
bes~ workers u;nproves output, so some coordination of workers' garment 
chOlces IS requrred. If work on a particular garment is spread over time, so 
that one worker adds additional stitching to a garment previously worked 
on by ~nother (as on an assembly line), then workers' output speeds are 
clearly mterdependent and coordination is again necessary. If certain work-
ers like each ?t~er, andbeing ~hysically located near their friends helps 
:herr productiVIty (or hmders It!), then coordinating where workers sit 
Improves productivity. 
Our chapter presents a game-theoretic perspective on coordination 
proble~s like thes~. ltbelongs in this book because choosing which action 
to. take m a coordination game is a social decision; it requires people to 
think about what others will do (and also about social values, such as 
wheth~~ they care to maximize their own payoffs or the group's payoffs). 
In addItion, we make a few comments about how decisions in coordination 
games may reflect heuristics visible in individual decision making. 
The mam goal of the chapter is to describe a class of coordination games, 
argue for .thelr re.levance to the stody of organizational decision making, 
and des<:"be findmgs from several experiments on such games. A second-
ary goal IS to whet read~rs' .appetites for broader application of game theo-
ry to the study of orgamzational behavior in the spirit of Murnighan (1994) 
and Gibbons (in press). 
8.2 Three kinds of impediments to coordination 
B~oadly ~peaking, the literatore on organizations has recognized three 
kinds of Impediments to coordination. In each case, we describe the im-
pediment, characterize it using a slightly different coordination game and 
give an organizational example. ' 
8.2.1 Team decisions and matching games 
The organizational problem. One kind of impediment to coordination arises 
whe~ group members all have the same preference rankings over the set of 
pOSSIble group outcomes (i.e., any action that leads to a higher payoff to 
one group member also leads to higher payoffs to all other members) but 
reaching the best outcome IS not easy. A group like this is called a team 
(Marschak & Radner, 1972). 
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Coordination failures in teams are typically attributed to the complexity 
of multiperson interactions and to the fact that group members have differ-
ent information or control different actions. For example, a firm may want 
to produce a single national-brand shoe, but five regional marketing direc-
tors all have different opinions (based on their local information) about 
which shoe will sell best. Their problem is how to aggregate information, 
not what to do afterward. 
Analysis of team decision-making problems focuses on the derivation of 
optimal decision policies under alternative information structures. Al-
though the theory of teams is interesting and important in its own right, 
from a behavioral perspective it is naturally limited because it assumes that 
team members all have the same goal. Radner's chapter in this book de-
scribes some important recent results on how to design team organizations 
to aggregate information optimally when information processing takes 
time and information depreciates over time. 
The game. A (noncooperative) game involves a set of players, strategies 
those players can choose, consequences that result from each combination 
of strategies, utilities that express how players value the possible conse-
quences, rules for which players move when and what players know when 
they move, and random choices by an exogeneous "nature" (which may 
include outside players who are uninterested in the outcome). A spate of 
recent books have made the basics of game theory accessible at many levels 
(e.g., Gibbons 1992); we will not dwell on details or definitions except 
when necessary. 
The simplest expression of a team coordination problem is a matching 
game, shown in Figure 8.1. Two players, labeled person 1 and person 2, 
choose either L Or H simultaneously. Each cell of the matrix shows the 
payoffs to the two players (in utilities) from each combination of choices; 
the first (second) number denotes person 1 (2) payoffs. For example, if both 
players choose L, denoted (L,L), they each get 5, and if both choose H, 
they each get 10. Figure 8.1 captures the most basic property of a team 
coordination problem because players agree that the outcome (H,H) is 
better than (L, L). 
Notice that the matching game captures the basic property of coordina-
tion we mentioned in the introduction because the player's payoffs are an 
interactive function of their choices: If they match choices they both do 
well, but if they mismatch they get nothing. 'Ii 
An example. C".nsi~er a luxury hotel that st;;ves ~o provid~ a high q~ality o~ :1 
custdomeSr servIce
th 
Yt tehnchoutralgml' ghlt~S sta £ to etattenti~e ~ c~s o::,er~:~ 
nee s. uppose a e 0 e s Ig y pre ers cus omers 0 c ec ou y l; 
P.M. rather than 2 P.M., but mainly worries that customers are not told two 11. 
different checkout times by different employees (because customers take We' 
•• t.h.e.c.o.n.fu_s.io.n_to_b.e_a.s.ig.n_o.f.l.o.w.-.q.u.a.li.ty_s.ervI_·.ce.,.f.o_r_e_x_a_m_p_l_e_,_o_r_re_s_e_n_t ___ ~~1 
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person 2 
Pe[SDO ] L H 
~I 5,5 0,0 0, ° 10,10 
Figure S.l. Matching game. 
wasting more time finding out which time is correct). Now consider the 
game played by two employees who must tell a guest the checkout time. If 
they share the group's (hotel's) payoffs, their payoffs are like those in a 
matching game. The two employees would like to match the times they 
announce and prefer to both say 1 P.M., but their main concern is to avoid 
mismatching times. 
. Obvi?usly, this coordination problem appears to be easily solved by 
mstructing employees to announce a single checkout time. But problems 
may arise under many circumstances - for example when new employees 
arrive from other hotels with 2 P.M. checkout times. Now the old employ-
ees must guess whether new employees will remember to say 1 P.M. or will 
forgetfully say 2 P.M.; the old employees must guess what new employees 
will guess they will guess; and so on. 
8.2.2 Mixed-motive conflict, bargaining, and battle-of-the-sexes games 
The organizational problem. A second impediment to coordination arises 
when group members have different preferences about organizational out-
comes (e.g., principal-agent conflicts). For example, many applications of 
negotiations to organizational behavior discuss the bargaining problem 
that arises between organization members (e.g., Neale & Bazerman, 1991). 
The typical bargaining problem has a set of mutually agreeable possible 
solutions and an impasse or no-agreement point that is worse than any of 
the candidate solutions. Bargainers all prefer one of the solution points to 
reaching an impasse, but each bargainer prefers a different point. This 
mixed-motive situation creates a coordination problem because bargainers 
would like to agree on some solution rather than none, but there are many 
possible solutions. 
Similarly, March and Simon (1958) and many others have stressed the 
importance of getting organization members to identify with organization-
al goals. Our discussion breaks "identification" into two different parts. In 
mixed-motive games the outcomes two players desire are not the same 
(though both desire to avoid some undesirable outcomes); hence there is 
no clear, single organizational goal both can identify with. In the risky 
coordination games we describe later, there is a clear, commonly desired 
outcome but players are not sure that others will risk striving for it. In these 
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Person 2 
person J L H 
L 10,5 0,0 
H~~0~,O~ ____ ~5~,~10~-" 
Figure 8.2. Battle-of-the-sexes game. 
games, "identifying" the organizational goal means not knowing that a 
goal exists but believing that others will strive for it. 
The game. A simple game known as battle of the sexes (BOS) captures this 
second impediment to coordination. Figure 8.2 shows payoffs in a BOS. 
Persons 1 and 2 both prefer matching to mismatching (and getting noth-
ing). But personl would rather match on (L,L) and get 10, and person 2 
would rather match on (H,H) and get 5. In a sense, persons 1 and 2 are 
bargaining over whether to divide a total possible gain of 15 into (10,5) or 
(5,10) or to mismatch and get nothing. 
An example. Returning to the hotel, consider two room service waiters 
standing in different parts of the kitchen as an order is finished, ready for 
delivery, and the cook signals for a waiter. Assume that both prefer to have 
the order delivered promptly (otherwise the customer's wrath will lead to 
substantial punishment for both of them), neither one wants to deliver it 
(or both dOl), and if both rush over to grab the order, an argument ensues 
that slows the delivery and harms them both. Then the game they play is a 
BOS with strategies relabeled (L corresponds to person 1 delivering, H to 
person 2 delivering). If they can communicate or have some shared organi-
zational rule (see March's and Zhou's chapters in this book), like seniority 
or delivery rotation, the bargaining problem is probably easily solved. But 
if communication is difficult, no rule exists, and the stakes are high, a 
coordination failure could result. 
8.2.3 Risky coordination, and assurance games 
The organizational problem. A third impediment to coordination arises when 
group members have common preferences over outcomes but the best 
outcome requires a risky action that group members do not want to take 
unless others do. Organizational change is like this if it requires members 
to make investments in learning new techniques that they prefer to make 
if, and only if, others do too. 
The game. Risky coordination can be captured in an assurance game, as in 
Figure 8.3 (also called stag hunt in game theory jargon). Suppose persons 1 
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Person 2 
PerS;Qn 1 L H 
~I 5, 5 5,0 0, 5 10,10 
Figure 8.3. Assurance game. 
and 2 can exert high (H) or low (L) effort. Low effort yields a certain 5 for 
the person exerting that low effort. High effort costs more, so chOOSing H 
alone yields 0, but if both players choose H they each earn 10. (If Hi = 1 
when player i chooses H, the payoff function for person 1 can be expressed 
as 5 - 5H, + 10H,H2, so the interaction or productive synergy between the 
effort choices of persons 1 and 2 are clear from the product term H,H2.) 
The players' preferences are consistent because person 1 is better off 
selecting action H if player 2 also selects H and better off selecting L if 2 also 
selects L. But the interdependence of each player's actions is fundamental 
because person 1 is better off choosing H only if person 2 chooses H as well. 
Note that the assurance game is a form of matching because players want 
to match other players' choices. The difference is that the mismatch payoffs 
are not all zero (as in Figure 8.1 matching). Because the mismatch payoff 
from choosing L is 5 and the mismatch payoff from choosing H is 0, L is 
less risky than H and might be chosen even though (H,H) is beUer. 
An example. Back to the hotel. Suppose that a customer's total level of 
satisfaction is disproportionately affected by the minimum level of service 
she receives; if she has a bad experience with anyone on the hotel staff, her 
overall level of customer satisfaction is low. Moreover, suppose that the 
combination of intrinsic and extrinsic rewards implies that each employee 
prefers that customers receive the highest level of job satisfaction, but each 
employee does not want to exert extra effort toward this goal if the extra 
effort does not raise the customer's overall level of satisfaction. Under these 
assumptions, a hotel employee's decision to exert extra effort to increase a 
customer's level of satisfaction depends on his expectations concerning the 
minimum level of service that will be provided by the other hotel employ-
ees. If his expectations are low, then he does not want to risk providing 
high-quality service. Conversely, if his expectations are high, then he does 
not want to be the only one to upset the customer by providing low-quality 
service. High levels of customer satisfaction will be achieved only if each 
employee expects that a significant number of other employees will pro-
vide high-quality service. 
Notice that prescribing a policy of high-quality service would work in a 
team theory framework (captured by the matching game), but in an assur-
ance game it works only if employees believe others will adhere to the 
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policy. Simply announcing the policy is not enough: It must be credible, 
widely believed, and so on. 
8.2.4 An aside on terminology: Equilibrium 
Up to now we have defined a coordination problem as a joint decision-
making problem. This definition is useful for categorizing impediments to 
coordination, but it makes no predictions about how players will behave. 
The central predictive tool in simple games like these is the Nash equilibri-
um, a set of strategies that are mutual best responses to one another. Notice 
that strategy is simply a fancy word for the choices players can make. An 
equilibrium is some predicted outcome of the game or set of strategies cho-
sen by players. 
To illustrate the Nash equilibrium concept, consider the assurance game 
in Figure 8.3. This game has two (pure-strategy) Nash equilibria - the low 
equilibrium (L,L) and the high equilibrium (H,H). The outcome (L,L) is a 
Nash equilibrium because if one player expects the other player to select L, 
then that player should also select L. (The two L choices are mutual best 
responses.) The same is true for the outcome (H,H). If each player expects 
the other player to select H, then it is a best response to also select H. Note 
also that both players are better off in the H equilibrium, so we call (H,H) 
efficient and (L,L) inefficient. 
The outcomes (H,L) and (L,H) are not Nash equilibria. For example, 
suppose player 1 expects player 2 to select L, and player 2 expects player 1 
to select H. Then player 1 should select L (not H), and player 2 should 
select H (not L). The key difference is that in equilibrium, expectations are 
aligned with actions, whereas out of equilibrium they are not. This notion 
of equilibrium is not very different from the same term used by Kurt 
Lewin, who saw equilibria as the result of conflicting social forces pushing 
in various directions. 
Now that we have explained what an equilibrium is, we can use the BOS 
in Figure 8.2 to illustrate why getting game theory right is important. In 
addition to the equilibria (L,L) and (H,H) in BOS, there is a third mixed 
strategy equilibrium in which both players choose random mixtures, play-
ing L with two-thirds probability and H with one-third probability. (Those 
mixtures by one player make the other player indifferent between playing 
Land H, so the mixed strategies are weak best responses to each other.) The 
mixed strategies yield an expected payoff of 10(2/9) + 5(2/9) = 30/9, or 3.33 
to each player. Notice that two players using this strategy will have a joint 
payoff of (3.33,3.33), which is lower for both of them than either the (L,L) 
payoff of (10,5) or the (H,L) payoff of (5,10). But (3.33,3.33) is an equilibri-
um because players choosing it are too stubborn, put loosely, to switch 
unilateraliy to something better. Therefore, as in Figures 8.1 and 8.3, the 
players could choose a pair of strategies that are best responses, and hence 
a (Nash) equilibrium, but that are inefficient. A critic who then concludes 
1 
i 
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that players are not rational, or not obeying game theory, misunderstands 
the game theory. 
The assurance game illustrates the two key features of a coordination 
game: The game has multiple Nash equilibria, and the set of equilibria are 
Pareto-rankable. Pareto-rankable simply means that for any two Nash equi-
libria in the game, one equilibrium is better for both players than the other. 
Notice that this game-theoretic definition is narrower than the traditional 
definition we gave at the start of this chapter. Most important, the tradi-
tional definition includes a situation in which a Pareto-optimal outcome is 
not a Nash equilibrium (hence, players have no individual incentive to 
work toward the group goal) as a kind of coordination problem. 
8.3 The subtle relation between cooperation and coordination 
The use of simple games to study organizational phenomena is not new. 
However, such research has focused largely on the N-player prisoners' 
dilemma (PD) games (or social dilemmas). Although the application of the 
N-player PD has taught us about the conditions under which cooperation 
may be observed in an organization, we argue next that very few true PDs 
exist in organizational life and that the essential property of most apparent 
PDs is the coordination problem embedded in them. 
8.3.1 Prisoners' dilemma game 
Coordination failure occurs in the assurance game (Figure 8.3) because 
each player's expectations are not aligned on the (H,H) outcome. If player 1 
expects player 2 to select L, then her optimal action is to also select L, and 
likewise for player 2. This coordination problem is distinct from a problem 
of cooperation, where achieving optimal group outcomes requires that in-
dividual members of the group suboptimize their individual payoffs. 
In Figure 8.4 we alter the assurance game in Figure 8.3 to create a version 
of the well-known PD. The payoffs are identical to those of the assurance 
game except for the payoff to a player if he or she selects D (defect) and the 
other player selects C (cooperate) (known as the temptation payoff in the PD 
literature). This payoff has been raised from 5 to 12. So, for example, if 
player 1 selects D and player 2 selects C, then player 1 receives 12, his or 
her highest payoff. This changes the game dramatically. Because neither 
player has an incentive to select the high-quality action, the low-quality 
outcome will occur, resulting in the lowest possible total payoffs. The only 
way the players will be able to coordinate their actions on the high-quality 
outcome is if they both forego maximizing their individual payoffs in the 
interest of maximizing their joint payoff. 
Note that PD has a unique equilibrium, so it does not represent an 
impediment to coordination in the game-theoretic sense. However, it does 
characterize a situation in which players' choices will lead to inefficiency. 
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Person J D c 
D 5,5 12,0 
C L-_O~'c...!1",2 __ ----,l(~)'c...!1~()---.J 
Figure 8.4. Prisoners' dilemma. 
8,3.2 How to tell PD and coordination games apart 
The central feature of a PD is that players have dominant strategies that, 
when played by everyone, lead to an inefficient outcome that everyone 
dislikes. The central feature of coordination, as we have defined it, is that 
players do not have dominant strategies because they prefer to reciprocate 
(or match) the strategy that produces the efficient outcome; but they also 
prefer to reciprocate an inefficient strategy. Hence, the crucial difference 
between the two kinds of games is the answer to a simple question: Do 
players prefer to reciprocate the high-outcome strategy? If not, the game is 
PD. If so, the game is coordination. 
8.3.3 Are most apparent PDs really coordination games? 
We argue that under three common conditions, games classified as PDs are 
essentially coordination games because players would like to reciprocate 
cooperation. 
1. In many apparent PDs, players can earn more money by defecting 
when another player cooperates (so defection is a dominant strategy), but 
they reciprocate cooperation instead. For example, about half of the sub-
jects cooperate in one-shot experimental PDs (e.g., Ledyard, 1995), and 
players who expect cooperation tend to cooperate more frequently than 
those who expect defection. These players appear to care about sO!Jlething 
besides maximizing their own monetary payoffs; they prefer to reciprocate 
"nice" behavior (sacrificing money to enrich another person) with niceness 
(Rabin, 1993; Sally 1995). The players appear to have an internal represen-
tation of the game as a problem of coordinating levels of niceness or coop-
erativeness. 
2. In many apparent PDs, there is a superadditive synergy or comple-
mentarity if both players cooperate. (Think of members of an R&D team 
who hold different pieces of a scientific puzzle and whose pieces are worth 
much less until they are combined. Step-level or threshold public-good games 
have this property too; see Rapoport, 1987. Games with participation or 
network externalities or bandwagon effects are coordination games too.) Con-
versely, it may be easy to identify players who defect and exclude them 
from sharing gains from cooperation by others. For example, team mem-
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bers can report whether others contributed or not, and supervisors use 
these self-reports to allocate rewards. If synergies from mutual cooperation 
are large enough or exclusion of defectors is easy enough, then players 
who reciprocate cooperation will earn more money than defectors. Then 
the game is a coordination game, not a PD. 
3. Suppose PD is infinitely repeated, with no apparent end in Sight, 
players are not too impatient (i.e., they have a low discount rate), and they 
can change their behavior in anyone period to respond to what others did 
before. Then a well-known folk theorem in game theory implies that recip-
rocating cooperation is one money-maximizing strategy (if failing to do so 
triggers tit-for-tat punishment in later periods). The repeated PD is thus a 
coordination game; players need to coordinate on when to defect - prefera-
bly never! 
These arguments show that an apparent PD is essentially a coordination 
game unless all of the following conditions are met: (1) the players don't 
care whether others are nice or not, (2) there are low synergies or ability to 
punish defectors, and (3) there is either a limited time horizon, impatient 
players, or forgetful players. It is easy to think of unorganized social situa-
tions, like looting during catastrophes or overusing a common reSOurce 
pool like a field, river, or lake, which may satisfy all three criteria and hence 
are pure PDs. But because organizations usually have long time horizons 
and can observe members, who know each other and may be friends, it is 
hard to think of any organizational examples that satisfy all three of these 
criteria. 
For example, some people have written about organizations as "com-
mon pool resource dilemmas" in which players can take resources from a 
common pool that reproduces or replenishes itself at a natural rate (e.g., 
Kramer, 1990; Mannix & White, 1992; see also Kidwell & Bennett, 1993). In 
most organizations, taking resources is largely constrained by organiza-
tional rules. Putting that obvious criticism aside, if the organization is long-
lived, then there are eqUilibria in which players take patiently from the 
common pool and an inefficient equilibrium in which everyone takes ev-
erything immediately, if they can. Hence the core problem in such a dilem-
ma is coordinating on the good (slow consumption) equilibrium. 
An interesting exception may be organizations near bankruptcy or un-
dergoing downsizing, in which workers may become angry at employers 
and time horizons shrink. Otherwise, we hope to have shifted the burden 
of proof to those scholars who study PDs, to show precisely why the key 
feature of any situation they model is PD (dominant strategies yielding 
Pareto-inefficiency) rather than coordination. 
8.3.4 Are coordination games more common than PDs? 
There are at least two mathematical ways in which we can compare how 
common coordination and PD games are. First, Rapoport and Guyer (1976) 
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classified all two-strategy, two-player (2 x 2) games into one of 78 types. 
Only one is a PO and several are coordination games in one of the three 
categories illustrated by our hotel examples. Seen this way, POs are actu-
ally quite rare and coordination games are much more common. 
Second, Stanford (1995) extends several remarkable theorems on how 
many pure-strategy equilibria exist in games where players' payoffs are 
randomly and independently determined. He shows that as the number of 
strategies grows, the chance that a game has· exactly k pure-strategy equi-
libria approaches .371kL This simple expression implies that the frequency 
of single-equilibrium games (k = 1) is about 37% as the number of strategies 
expand. But POs are a special type of single-equilibrium game: They re-
quire all players to have dominated strategies that lead to a Pareto-
inefficient outcome. (As the number of strategies expands, the chance that 
a game with random payoffs has this special PO property goes toward 
zero.) Hence, POs are only a small fraction of the 37% of single-equilibrium 
games. 
At the same time, one can show that games with two or more equilibria 
occur randomly 26% of the time; all of these games represent coordination· 
problems. Therefore, as the number of strategies grows large, there is a" 
strict mathematical sense in which coordination problems become more 
and more (relatively) frequent than POs (assuming payoffs are randomly 
chosen). And because enlarging the number of strategies makes games 
more realistic, we can argue that with a realistic view of the world, PO is a 
much less likely representation of an organizational problem than coor-
dination is. 
8.3.5 Example: The employment relationship as a coordination problem 
Several different literatures focus On the underlying structure of the em-
ployment relationship. An emerging literature on organizational citizen-
ship behavior posits that organizationally beneficial behavior exists within 
organizations that is not driven by formal obligations dictated by the em-
ployment contract (Organ, 1988). Work on psychological contracting fo-
cuses on workers' and managers' perceptions of the unwritten terms of 
their employment contract (see Rousseau & Parks, 1992). The analogous 
question in economics is how contracting parties behave under an implicit 
contract, or when unspecified contingencies occur. The economists' answer 
is usually pessimistic: Parties try to exploit one another when something 
not explicitly covered in their contract occurs. An alternative answer some 
economists have advanced is that happy workers repay "gifts" given to 
them by firms in the form of higher-than-market-clearing wages (beneficial 
nonwage gifts work equally well) with unmeasured effort (Akerlof & 
Yellen, 1990). 
From the perspective of game theory, ali of these literatures describe the 
same fundamental phenomenon. In workplaces there are (at least) two 
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sorts of equilibria: (1) Firms treat workers well and workers reciprocate by 
providing more effort than is required, or (2) firms and workers strike an 
emotionally neutral bargain to exchange money for clearly specified work; 
when something unforeseen occurs, neither side gives anything extra. If 
outcome (1) is an equilibrium, because workers acquire sympathy, affec-
tion, or loyalty, for their firm, then the game is One of coordination, not 
cooperation. Workers and employers are trying to coordinate on whether 
to behave nicely or not. 
8.4 Uses (and misuses) of game theory 
in studying organizations 
So far we have discussed kinds of coordination problems in firms, simple 
games that capture the features of these problems, and have argued that 
coordination rather than PO may be the kind of game most common in 
organizational life. Before proceeding, we offer a few comments about why 
many studies of organizational behavior have been reluctant to incorporate 
even simple aspects of game theory (beyond PO). An important barrier to 
thinking game-theoretically may be a misunderstanding of what game the-
ory is good for and is meant to do. 
8.4.1 What is game theory good for? 
Game theory can be separated into two distinct parts: (1) a library of games 
as a system for classifying social situations and (2) a body of mathematical 
knowledge about how idealized players with varying degrees of rationality 
would actually play (equilibrium analysis). 
The usefulness of games as a classification system (Aumann, 1985) is 
largely independent of whether the mathematics in part (2) is useful, non-
sensical, empirically wrong, or whatever. For example, in the discussion so 
far, we have not leaned heavily on the idea of equilibrium or discussed the 
rationality of players (beyond simple utility maximization, which in these 
examples simply means picking the highest of three numbers). Our claim is 
that merely describing three kinds of coordination problems in game-
theoretic terms provides a parsimonious, clear language that can help clas-
sify them. Furthermore, carefully distinguishing PO from coordination, in 
the previous section, makes it clear that very few organizational situations 
are pure POs, and most have elements of coordination. Thus, even without 
doing any equilibrium analysis or predicting how people will play these 
games, simply using the games as a classification system can be of some use. 
An analogy to biology may help illustrate our point. Biologists have 
produced careful classifications of organisms, into categories of varying 
depth - warm- and cold-blooded mammals, birds, plants, and so on. Each 
category is precisely defined by a small set of features (birds have feathers, 
fly, and lay eggs), and some exceptions are noted (penguins). Biologists 
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also study the deepest workings of barely observable features of organ-
isms, like DNA, genes, and neurons. But the scientific validity of the latter 
work has little to do with the usefulness of the former. Birdwatchers will 
find species classifications extremely useful even if their understanding of 
the genetic bases of diseases is incomplete or wrong. 
8.4.2 What is eqUilibrium analysis good for? 
The mathematical ideas in game theory about how rational players might 
play (in equilibrium) have come under reasonable attack from philoso-
phers, psychologists, experimentalists - and many game theorists - as 
exaggerated descriptions of how normally intelligent people would behave 
(e.g., Zajac & Bazerman, 1991). Virtually all game theorists now concede 
this point. In response, current research generally takes equilibria derived 
from mathematical reasoning as possible limiting points to which players 
might converge in repeated play and asks whether simple (boundedly 
rational), adaptive decision rules or evolutionary dynamics will lead mathe-
matically to these equilibria or to others. The criticism that eqUilibrium 
analysis is irrelevant because people aren't smart enough to figure out the 
equilibria misses the point of the adaptive and evolutionary analyses. 
8.4.3 Games are mental models 
Game theory is usually silent on "where" a game exists. Because games are 
written carefully in matrices (like Figures 8.1 to 8.4), and sometimes in 
more complicated trees, the immediate image is something like a score-
board at which all the players look, showing a payoff matrix. This image is 
misleading. 
Instead, consider a team of basketball players in a large arena, where the 
scoreboard hangs above their heads so that they can't see it as they play. 
"Where" is the score? It is sensible to say that the score exists both on the 
scoreboard above the players (where fans can see it) and also in the players' 
heads as they play. 
Similarly, it is sensible to think of games as internal representations, or 
mental models, which exist entirely in the heads of players. The games we 
write down and discuss in this chapter are like the score on the scoreboard 
above the basketball players' heads. The assurance game in Figure 8.3, for 
example, is our understanding of the most basic features of how two orga-
nizational members think about the consequences of their choices. 
The mental model interpretation of games raises many new questions: 
Do players have the same mental models? How are mental models con-
structed and revised? When players are given written models, how do they 
create mental models from them? (How oversimplified are their models? 
See Neale and Bazerman, 1991.) These questions are novel for game theory 
because generally the game-theoretic action begins after a game is posed 
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and becomes ripe for equilibrium analysis. But addressing them could 
prove a very important application of psychology and organization studies 
to empirical game theory. Porac, Thomas, and Emme's (1987) study of 
perceived competition among businesses is an interesting start. 
8.4.4 Why are researchers so fascinated by PD? 
Echoing Murnighan (1994) and Gibbons (in press), an underlying theme of 
our chapter is that organizational researchers should consider a wider vari-
ety of games than PD. This raises a natural question: Why is PD so popular 
among so many scholars? Besides being studied by various types of organi-
zation researchers, PDs are widely studied by social psycholOgists, political 
scientists, biologists, and many others. 
We think some of the popularity of PD arises from a simple combination 
of an error in logic and ignorance of other kinds of games. In theory, 
players engaging in a PD or social dilemma will choose inefficiently. (That 
is, individually rational players make choices that make everyone worse 
off.) Because PD implies inefficiency, organizational researchers looking for 
a game-theoretic model of how conflict between personal and group goals 
results in organizational inefficiency might instinctively think of PD as if it 
were the right model of individual-group conflict. This is simply wrong 
because many other interesting games predict possible inefficiencies and 
may be better models for organizational phenomena than PD. 
For example, in the coordination games we describe, efficient outcomes 
and inefficient outcomes are possible. Groups or firms can get stuck in an 
equilibrium nobody likes because they cannot coordinate a simultaneous 
switch to a better equilibrium (and players will voluntarily switch only if 
they think others will). This simple feature seems to characterize problems 
of "dinosaur" firms (like Sears and GM) at least as well as PD does (see also 
Rumelt, 1995, esp. pp. 115-117). It can also account for path dependencies, 
the tyranny of the past, the extreme sensitivity of eqUilibrium results to 
initial conditions, and other features commonly associated with organiza-
tional paradox. In Knez and Camerer (1994) we draw the analogy between 
norms or beliefs in coordination games and intangible expectational assets, 
which are one kind of resource described in popular resource-based views of 
differential firm success in business strategy research. Notice that a history 
of coordination on an inefficient eqUilibrium is like an expectationalliability 
and, like a bad reputation, it cannot be easily disposed of. 
Another class of games that often exhibit inefficiencies are games with 
information asymmetries. Gibbons (in press) argues cogently that games of 
this sort may serve as sharp models of many sorts of organizational behav-
ior that appear perverse. In these games, inefficiencies typically result 
because players must take inefficient actions to convey their information 
credibly (or "signal") to others. For example, the current game-theoretic 
theory of strikes is that labor or management strikes in order to signal 
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private information credibly about their own reservation wages to the other 
side (Kennan & Wilson, 1990). Other papers model inefficiencies that an~e 
from the "herd behavior" of rational corporate managers. For example, m 
Scharfstein and Stein (1990), managers will sometimes choose to forego 
unusual, high-profit projects and instead follow the herd, mimicking what 
other managers do, to avoid the risk of being thought of as bad managers. 
Kanodia, Bushman, and Dickhaut (1989) argue similarly that escalation to 
organizational commitment may result from managers' refusal to abandon 
projects to protect their reputations. Prendergast (1993) builds a theory of 
"yes men" around the idea that subjective evaluations of workers by sup~­
riors are necessary to help an organization decide who to promote, but thiS 
evaluation process naturally gives workers too strong an incentive to 
please their bosses. . .. 
We do not believe that game-theoretic models like these are dehmtive 
explanations for inefficient organizational practices. Indeed, these rational-
izations usually compete directly with other behavIOral explanations that 
are widely accepted by decision researchers. But such models create sharp 
competition between explanations based on incomplete information and 
those based on bounded rationality, and clarify what sort of data would 
support each explanation in an empirical competition that constitutes the 
logical next step. 
8.5 Coordination and organizational expectations 
The application of simple coordination games to organizational coordina-
tion problems focuses attention on mechanisms that transfonn expecta-
tions rather than mechanisms that transform preferences. We will refer to 
such expectations as organizational expectations. Coordination is achieved 
through organizational expectations because all members share a common 
expectation of how all the other members will behave. Building on the 
chapters of March and Zhou (this book), organizational expectations sup-
port organizational rules (or norms) that define the actions a member 
should take (or not take) in a particular situation, and result in the coor-
dination and control of organizational activities. 
Until recently, economists have had little to say about organization~ 
expectations. Such issues had been contained in the "black box" of orgam-
zational processes that economists found convenient to ignore. However, 
the extensive introduction of noncooperative game theory into economics 
starting in the late 1970s and continuing today has provided economists 
with the analytic machinery to begin addressing this topic. ., 
Game theory allows us to be precise about the structure of organIZation-
al expectations. Simplifying a bit, what is required is that each members 
belief about the other member's intention to follow a particular rule IS 
mutually understood. For example, in the assurance game, the rule "select 
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the action associated with the most efficient outcome" (the efficiency rule for 
short) selects the Pareto-efficient outcome (H,H). In order for the efficiency 
rule to be followed, player 1 must believe that player 2 expects him (player 
1) to follow the rule, and likewise player 2 believes that player 1 expects 
him (player 2) to follow the rule. In game theory this is known as the mutual 
knowledge condition and is a necessary condition for the existence of a Nash 
equilibrium.2 
The mutual knowledge condition merely fonnalizes the notion that in 
order for a rule of behavior to be followed, there must exist mutually 
reinforcing expectations between the players that the rule will be followed. 
Since mutual knowledge is a necessary condition for a Nash equilibrium, 
we can study organizational expectations by studying the selection of Nash 
equilibria. Unfortunately, game theory does not provide us with a strong 
theory that predicts which equilibria will be selected in coordination 
games. Instead, we are left with less satisfying focal principles (Schelling, 
1960). A focal principle posits that certain deductive properties of the game 
being played will create mutually consistent beliefs among its players about 
how others will play the game. The most well-studied focal principle is 
payoff dominance (Harsanyi & Selten, 1988). Under payoff dominance, if a 
unique Pareto-efficient equilibrium exists, then it will be selected in the 
interest of efficiency.3 That is, players will intuit that all other players will 
select the Pareto-efficient strategy because they also believe that everyone 
else will do the same. Pareto dominance is simply a fancy name for the 
efficiency rule discussed earlier. 
Selection principles such as Pareto dominance are predictions about how 
players intuit rules of behavior from the mere structure of payoffs in the 
game. Any additional information about how other players in the game 
will behave, through either direct or third-party communication, is treated 
separately. Although game theorists and experimental economists who 
study equilibrium selection in coordination games do not normally address 
the more specific issue of organizational expectations, we argue that it 
provides a fruitful research paradigm for studying this issue. 
Up to now, most of the research on equilibrium selection in coordination 
games has focused on how the structure of coordination games affects 
equilibrium selection. Loosely put, a game's structure is described by its 
payoffs, the number of players, and the set of actions available to each 
player. Specifically, researchers ask: Does the structure of a particular coor-
dination game provide players with enough information to intuit the mutu-
al knowledge condition underlying a well-specified rule of behavior (such 
as the efficiency rule)? Normally, the following baseline conditions are 
created to answer this question experimentally: (1) the structure of the 
game (payoffs, number of players, actions) is common knowledge and (2) 
players are not able to communicate with each other, nor do they know the 
identity of the other players (no possibility of repeated interaction). The 
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outcome in the baseline condition (e.g., the efficient equilibrium versus the 
inefficient equilibrium in the assurance game) tells us whether or not more 
formal forms of communication are required to induce mutual knowledge. 
In the following section, we highlight recent experimental work in this 
area. As we proceed, the experimental results reported involve richer hy-
potheses that begin to shed light on the issue of organizational expecta-
tions. 
8.6 Experimental results on coordination games 
Several recent experiments study how subjects play coordination games. 
In this section, we describe previous findings that represent initial steps in 
understanding the game-theoretic structure of organizational expectations. 
After describing the results, we make some remarks about experimental 
methods and how psychological experiments might differ in style from the 
ones we describe. 
8.6.1 Results on two-player assurance games with and without 
" cheaptalk" 
Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross (1992) examine behavior in a 2 x 2 
"assurance" coordination game shown in Figure 8.5. If subjects choose L, 
they earn $.80 for sure. If they choose H, they earn nothing if others choose 
Land $1 if others also choose H. Hence, choosing L is an equilibrium. 
Choosing H is an equilibrium also - which yields $1 points for each player 
- but it is riskier because it pays nothing if the other players choose L. The 
authors' subjects played the one-shot aSSurance game 11 times with differ-
ent players. Players did not know the identity of the players they were 
paired with, nor did they know the history of decisions other than in their 
own previous games. 
Out of a total of 165 subject pairs, 160 (97%) played the inefficient equi-
librium (L,L). The remaining five pairs played disequilibrium outcomes 
(L,H) or (H,L). Notice that even though (H,H) is an equilibrium, players 
never reached it. Choosing H maximizes the expected payoff only if the 
probability that one's partner chooses H is above 80%. This required level 
of assurance seems to be too high. 
Cooper et al. (1992, 1994) also studied the impact of one-way and two-
way communication on assurance and subsequent choices. Under one-way 
communication, only one player sends a message announcing the action 
she intends to select. Subjects are not required to choose the action they 
announced (in game theory this nonbinding preplay communication is 
called cheap talk). Under one-way communication, most players (87%) said 
they would play H. (All data we report are from the last 11 of 22 periods.) 
Then 88 of the 165 subject pairs (53%) played the efficient equilibrium 
(H,H), 51 pairs (31 %) played disequilibrium outcomes, and the remaining 
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Figure B.S. Assurance game payoffs (in dollars). (From Cooper et al., 1992) 
16% played the inefficient outcome (L,L). The problem was that many 
players who received the H message (24%) weren't willing to bet that the 
message sender would follow through and chose the safe L instead. in-
deed, many of those who sent H did not choose H subsequently (20%). 
Hence, although one-way communication raises the percentage of (H,H) 
play from virtually none to about half, it does not fully solve the coordina-
tion problem. 
Under two-way communication both players simultaneously send mes-
sages. Then players always announced they would H, and 150 of the 165 
subject pairs (90%) did play the efficient (H,H) equilibrium. Two-way com-
munication almost fully resolves the coordination problem in the assurance 
game. 
8.6.2 Basic results on the weakest-link game 
The weakest-link (or minimum-action) game is a many-player version of the 
assurance game that captures the gist of any situation in which a group or 
organizational goal is disproportionately affected by the lowest quality of 
each individual's inputs.- Figure 8.6 provides a matrix-form example of the 
weakest-link game in which players choose numbers5 1-7. The figure 
shows the payoffs to a subject who chooses a Row action when the mini-
mum action chosen by any subject in a group (including the row player) is 
shown in Column. For example, suppose there are three players, A, B, and 
C, and player A selects a 5, player B selects a 4, and player C selects a 3. 
The minimum action selected is 3; hence, player A receives $.70, player B 
receives $.80, and player C receives $.90. In this example, player A "loses" 
$.20 by selecting an action two increments above the minimum action 
selected. Each player wants to select exactly the minimum of the other 
players, and everyone wants the minimum to be as high as possible. But 
selecting high actions is risky because other players may select low actions. 
The assurance game is a two-person weakest-link game, and the payoffs in 
Figure 8.3 provide a way to extend the game to more players. 
The customer satisfaction problem described earlier is an example of a 
weakest-link game. Assume that a customer's level of satisfaction with 
hotel service is determined by the lowest quality of service she receives. 
Then the weakest link in the chain of customer service is most important. 
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SMALLEST VALUE OF X CHOSEN 
7 \.IO 0.90 0.70 0.50 0.30 0.10 
YOUR 6 1.00 0.80 0.60 0.40 0.20 
CHOICE 5 0.90 0.70 0.50 0.30 
OFX 4 0.80 0.60 0.40 
3 0.70 0.50 
2 0.60 
Figure 8.6. Weakest-link game. 
Other organizational examples include (1) manufacturing a sensitive 
product, which is very likely to fail if any single part fails (some food and 
chemical production requires strict adherence to a "recipe" and very pure 
inputs; one bad ingredient ruins the whole batch); (2) production of safety 
in high-reliability organizations, which fail if a single failure occurs; (3) 
keeping a secret (or not repeating an organizational rumor), assuming that 
one or more leaks are equally harmful and assuming that everyone prefers 
to keep the secret only if everyone else will too; and (4) games of timing in 
which a project cannot be completed until all the parts are complete, such 
as assembling a report or prospectus or producing a book or special issue 
like this one (which can't be published until all chapters are in). 
In all these cases, if poor quality of specific inputs is difficult to identify, 
and if participants dislike putting in high-quality inputs but share in an 
improved group output if everyone puts in high quality, then the weakest-
link game provides a crisp description of an incentive problem that does 
not depend on the existence of a social dilemma. Inefficient behavior is 
created by the mere expectation that there is at least one weak link in the 
chain rather than by the incentive to free-ride if others are strong links. 
Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (1990) (hereafter VBB) were the first to 
study behavior in the weakest-link game. In their experiments, roughly 15 
undergraduate subjects played the game 10 times for the dollar payoffs 
shown in Figure 8.3. After each period of play the minimum action was 
publicly announced. 
In all seven of their experimental replications, the number 1 was the 
minimum action selected after 10 periods of play, and roughly 75-90% of 
the subjects selected a 1 in the 10th period of play (see Fig. 8.7). Hence, not 
only do large numbers of players find it difficult to play the weakest-link 
game efficiently, they tend to play the most inefficient equilibrium. 
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3-player games (KC. 1995) 14-16 player games (VBB.1990) 
Actions Minima Minima Actions Minima Minima 
Actions period 1 period 1 period 5 period 1 period 1 period 5 
1 8 (.13) 5 6 2 (.02) 2 7 
2 3 (.05) 1 3 5 (.05) 2 0 
3 8 (.13) 7 4 5 (.05) 1 0 
4 11 (.18) 3 3 18 (.17) 1 0 
5 4 (.07) I 0 34 (.32) 1 0 
6 1 (.02) 0 0 10 (.09) 0 0 
7 25 (.42) 3 4 33 (.31) 0 0 
Iolal 60 (UJO) 20 20 107(1.00) 7 7 
Figure 8.7. Distribution of individual actions and group minima in weakest-link 
game experiments. 
In Knez and Camerer (1994) we study three-player weakest-link games 
where players play the game for five periods with the same people. We 
find that three-player groups also have difficulty playing the weakest-link 
game efficiently. The distribution of individual actions in the first period, 
and minimum actions across 20 groups in the first and fifth period of play, 
are described in Figure 8.7. In both the 3-player and IS-player games, there 
is significant dispersion in the minimum action selected in the first period 
of play. This dispersion remains in the fifth period of play in the three-
player games, and four of the groups reach an efficient minimum of 7. But 
in the 14- to 16-player games the minimum action selected in the fifth 
period is a 1 in every group. (Minima of 1 were also observed by Cachon 
and Camerer, 1996, for nine-player groups and by Knez and Camerer, 
1994, for six-player groups.) 
It appears that although small groups of players do not generally play 
the weakest-link game efficiently (only 4 of 20 reached the efficient out-
come of 7), they do a better job of maintaining the level of efficiency 
achieved in early periods of play than do larger groups. 
8.6.3 The effect of feedback, subject pools, and group expansion 
Five treatments that may be of special interest to organizational researchers 
have been studied. 
Feedback. In most of their sessions, VBB (1990) announced only the mini-
mum action chosen in a group to the group members. An organization 
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could announce the entire distribution of actions, and this might improve a 
group's ability to coordinate on a number higher than 1. In some sessions, 
VBB did announce the full distribution, but this did not matter much; if 
anything, it speeded up the inexorable process of convergence to 1 across 
trials. 
Subject pools. The general pattern of convergence to low-number choices is 
robust across small variations in subject pools. Besides undergraduates (at 
Texas A&M University, the University of Chicago, and the Wharton 
School), the weakest-link results have been replicated with strategy pro-
fessors (Knez & Camerer, 1994) and psychology professors. It would be 
useful to know whether enhancing group affiliation or organizational iden-
tification (e.g., Kramer, 1992) improves coordination. 
Group size. Several studies suggest two interesting effects of varying group 
size in the weakest-link game. First, it is natural to expect that the ability of 
a group of players to achieve the efficient outcomes increases as group size 
shrinks, and it does. If the probability that anyone of N players will select a 
small number is equal to p, then the probability that a small number is 
selected by at least one player is 1 - (1 - p)N, which increases rapidly as N 
rises. Second, players do not seem to appreciate how quickly this effect 
operates because Figure 8.7 shows that the distributions of first-period 
actions is almost the same in 3- and in 14- to 16-person games. (If anything, 
the small groups choose lower actions than the larger groups do.) If sub-
jects form vague beliefs over the choices others would make and then . 
compute their optimal response to the distribution of minima in their 
groups, they should choose much lower numbers when their groups are 
large. The fact that they do not suggests a kind of "law of small numbers" 
or representative thinking. Subjects seem to think a low minimum is equal-
ly likely in a large group and a small group (see the small- versus large-
hospital problem in Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). 
Group formation. Knez and Camerer (1994) combined two three-person 
groups, after five periods of weakest-link play, into a single six-person 
group. Suppose one group reached a minimum of 4 and the other reached a 
lower minimum of 2. Would the combined group achieve a new minimum 
of 4, 2, or something else? In all 10 combined groups, the new group's 
minimum was the lower of the previous two minima (a bad norm or expec-
tation drove out a good one). This effect occurred regardless of whether or 
not each three-person group knew the other group's previous history 
when they were combined. 
Bonus announcements. Knez and Camerer also studied (but did not report) 
the effect of an announced bonus on performance. First, six-person groups 
reliably converged to low number minima over several trials (7 of 10 groups 
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reached 1). Then the authors announced publicly that each member of a 
group would receive an extra bonus of 20 or 50 cents if everyone in the 
group chose a 7. (NOtice that a group with a minimum of 1 has an implicit 
bonus of 60 cents available already, smce choosing 7 pays $1.30, whereas 
choosmg 1 pays $.70.) This announcement had a dramatic effect: Eight of 
10 groups munedJately moved to a nurumum of 7. This result reminds us, 
as Cooper et al.'s two-way communication showed, how effective a small 
amount of public communication can be in improving coordination.6 
8.6.4 Norms and precedent formation 
The experimental results reported so far all concern the selection of the 
efficient equilibrium in various coordination games. The results provide 
powerful eVidence that the mere nsk that other players in the game will not 
select the efficient action results in inefficient behavior. In other words, 
under consistent preferences the mere existence of a Pareto-dominant out-
come is not enough to induce efficient outcomes. These results serve as a 
foundati~n for the broader study of organizational rules and norms. An 
orgaruzational rule is, by definition, a ru1e of behavior that exists prior to 
the selection of actions by the players in the game. This leaves open the 
question of how such rules develop and how robust they are to changes in 
the structure of the environment. 
The traditional approach to nOrm development (Schein, 1985) assumes 
the dynamiC process described by Homans (1951, p. 127): 
Norms ,do not ~aterialize out of nothing: they emerge from on-going activities ... . 
Men ?nng their norms to a group; they work out new norms through their experi-
ence In the group; they take old norms, confirmed or weakened, and the new ones, 
as developed, to other groups they are members of. If the norms take hold there a 
general tradition, the same in many groups, may grow up. ' 
There ~re two parts to Homans's description of the norm development 
process. First IS the development of norms within subgroups of the organi-
zation,. Second is the transfer of norms across the subgroups. Hence, an 
orgaruzational norm or rule arises as previously developed group rules are 
transferred to new groups over and over again. In order for an organiza-
tional mle to develop,. this adjustment process must lead to the develop-
ment m the orgamZ'l:IOn of common beliefs about appropriate modes of 
behavIOr m the orgamzation. 
At the hea~t of this adjustment process are precedent effects. The rules that 
emerge m pnor mteractions serve as precedents for future interactions. In 
the language of coordination games, the equilibria selected in previous 
coordmation games serve as precedents for future coordination games. 
Research on expenmental coordination games has documented the sig-
nificant role of precedents. Among the most notable examples is the work 
by VBB (1991) on the median-action game. In this game each player selects 
a number from the set of integers 1-7. Every player'S payoff is higher if the 
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median number chosen is higher, and a player's payoff falls if her number 
is further above or below the median. VBB find strong precedent effects in 
two forms in groups of 9-27 subjects. First, across all of the experimental 
treatments, the median action selected in all periods of play was exactly the 
same as the median action in the first period of play. The precedent set in 
the first period of play completely determined behavior in later periods. 
(Cachon & Camerer, 1996, replicated these results with nine-player 
groups.) Second, the equilibrium played in previous average opinion 
games transferred to analogous average opinion games. 
Bettenhausen and Murnighan (1985) studied precedent in repeated POs, 
most of which had payoffs that make them coordination games. They 
found strong transfer of cooperative nOrms across changes in game param-
eters. 
In Knez and Camerer (1995) we document strong precedent effects of 
two forms. In the experiments reported, subjects played both the weakest-
link game in Figure 8.6 repeatedly, as well as two-player and three-player 
PO games. In one treatment, subjects played all two-player games; m the 
other treatment, subjects played all three-player games. In both games the 
efficient outcome has all players selecting the number 7. In the weakest-
link games the efficient outcome is a Nash equilibrium; in the PO games it 
is not. We were interested in whether a norm of efficiency in the weakest-
link game would transfer to the PO game. 
In the two-player experiments, under treatment WP subjects played ~he 
weakest-link game for five periods and then played the PO game for five 
periods. Subjects played with the same opponents in all 10 periods of 'pla~. 
Under treatment WP, all five pairs of subjects played the effiClent equilibn-
um in all five periods of play of the weakest-link game. (The fact that all the 
two-player groups reach efficiency is remarkable because Figure 8.7 shows 
that only 20% of three-player groups reach the efficient equilibrium. There 
appears to be an important leap from two- to three-player groups.) In the 
subsequent PO, 90% of the subjects who experienced the precedent of 
efficient play in the weakest-link game selected a 7, the cooperative choice, 
in the first round of the PO game. 
Under treatment PW, subjects played the PO game for five periods and 
then played the weakest-link game for five periods. In this treatment sub-
jects do not experience the precedent of efficiency before playing th~ PO 
(since they play it right away), and only 25% (5 out of 20) of the subJects 
select a 7 in their first PO game. This difference between the fractions 
picking efficient 7's in the WP and PW treatments (90% versus 25%) is 
highly significant (X2 = 11.32, P < .001). This is a dramatic example of 
norm transfer. 
In the three-player treatments, Knez and Camerer had to take extra 
steps to get subjects to experience the precedent of efficiency because s,:,b-
jects rarely play the efficient equilibrium in the three-player weakest-link 
game. In round 1, four pairs of subjects first played the weakest-link game 
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for five periods. All of these four pairs played the efficient eqUilibrium (all 
choosing 7) in all five periods of play. In round 2, one subject was added to 
the two-player groups from round 1. All the new players observed the 
history of play of the two-player groups they were entering, and the round 
1 players knew this. Hence, the precedent of efficient play in round 1 was 
common knowledge in round 2. All four three-player groups played the 
efficient eqUilibrium in all five periods of round 2. These results are in 
striking contrast to the behavior observed in three-player weakest-link 
games where subjects had not experienced the precedent of efficient play 
in the two-player games. 
Finally, when players start out in three-player groups a precedent of 
inefficient play in the weakest-link game develops, but when they start out 
in two-player groups the precedent of efficiency develops. Again, we 
found a strong and significant precedent effect. Under the precedent of 
efficiency, 73% of the subjects select a 7 in the first period of the three-
player PO game, whereas under the inefficient precedent only 22% select a 
7 (XZ = 8.62, P < .004). 
In summary, Knez and Camerer (1995) found that the precedent of effi-
ciency transfers from the weakest-link game to the PO game in both two-
player and three-player groups. They also found that efficient behavior can 
be induced in three-player weakest-link games by first allowing players to 
develop the home-grown precedent of efficient play in the two-player 
weakest-link game. (We conjecture that one can develop efficient groups of 
any size in the weakest-link game this way by letting n-person groups play 
long enough to establish a firm history of efficient play of choosing 7's, 
letting newcomers know about this history, and adding only two or three 
players at a time.) 
8.6.5 A digression on economic and psychological experimental methods 
Most readers of this book are probably familiar with the experimental 
paradigm followed by organizational psychologists and relatively unfamil-
iar with (or even hostile to) the methods experimental economists use 
(e.g., Davis & Holt, 1992). For example, the experiments we just described 
may seem overly simple and devoid of context. We think the design differ-
ences in the two approaches spring largely, and defensibly, from basic 
differences in how knowledge is compiled in economics and psychology. 
We summarize this argument briefly (see Camerer, in press). 
The purpose of most economics experiments is to clearly operationalize 
a setting in which a theory makes a clear prediction. As a direct result of 
this goal, to study assurance games it is essential to create a situation in 
which (L,L) and (H,H) are both equilibria and (H,H) is better for everyone 
but riskier. If we cannot be sure that these conditions are met, then the 
game-theoretic predictions are not being tested and nothing is contributed 
to economic knowledge. To meet these conditions, the experiment uses an 
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abstract, a-realistic context (subjects choose numbers or letters). Subjects are 
also paid substantial financial incentives to help ensure that they really do 
prefer (H,H) to (L,L). The key design elements - abstract context and 
financial incentives - fit together to achieve the main purpose, which is to 
operationalize a setting about which game theory makes a prediction. 
The purpose of psychology experiments7 is generally to express an infor-
mal intuition or regularity in a dramatic, lifelike way or yield data with 
which to construct a new theory. Because subjects are often unpaid (e.g., 
participating for course credit), an abstract task might bore or confuse 
them, so a concrete one is better. Because their purpose is different from 
the theory-testing motive of economists, psychologists might study coor-
dination differently. 
For example, we could ask two subjects to perform a mildly aversive 
task, like pedaling a bicycle at either of two programmed rates, slow or 
fast, and pay them each a larger prize if they both pedal fast. (Tasks like this 
were used in early "social loafing" experiments; see Kidwell & Bennett, 
1993.) Simultaneous pedaling resembles an assurance game, but we cannot 
be sure it is. It is not an assurance game if either subject is fanatic enough 
about exercise to simply prefer pedaling faster; then (fast) is a dominant 
strategy so (slow,slow) is not an equilibrium. It is also not an assurance 
game if one subject (or both) dislikes pedaling so much that he would 
rather forego his prize than match the other player's fast pedaling; then 
(slow) is a dominant strategy and (fast, fast) is not an equilibrium. So to be 
sure that pedaling is really an assurance game, we must be sure that both 
players do not like pedaling too much or like it too little (and also be sure 
that players know this about others) or else control these preferences and 
beliefs.8 One way to control them is to use an abstract task like choosing 
letters or numbers and pay financial rewards, as in Figure 8.2. 
The advantage of a task like pedaling is its improvement in realism, 
external validity, or generalizability to organizations (compared to abstract 
number choosing for money). But this apparent improvement can be rea-
sonably disputed on two grounds. 
First, judgments of external validity should be grounded in a statis-
tical understanding of what organizational situations are common. Are 
pedaling-like tasks really more common than choosing abstract symbols 
that yield monetary rewards? The answer is hard to know. Consider a law 
firm. Attorneys on a litigation team who spend long hours in court, exert-
ing fatiguing effort, may be like subjects pedaling bikes. But other lawyers 
research legal details in a library or compile abstract symbols into briefs; 
perhaps their work is more like choosing letters that yield financial payoffs 
than like bike pedaling. 
Second, it is unclear that experiments should be like a random sample of 
realistic organizational situations. Scientists routinely oversample unusual 
situations (neglecting mundane ones). Neuroscientists study victims of 
unusual traumas, biologists study strange species, economists sfudy de-
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pressions and market crashes, and astronomers study supernovas. These 
phenomena are all rare and hence highly unrealistic, but they prOvide an 
efficient way to learn about general processes. While hesitating to claim the 
same status for the simple experiments described previously, we simply 
want to question (1) how to determine which experiments are most realistic 
and (2) whether realism is desirable. 
A final thought about context: Economic experiments are happily unre-
alistic because economics and game theory make no special predictions 
about behavior in more or less realistic situations. (If the purpose of the 
experiment is theory testing, the experiments need only be as realistic as 
the theory.) This does not mean that game theorists insist that context does 
not matter to outcomes. It simply means that there is no systematic theory 
of precisely how context matters. Obviously, one way to build up such a 
theory is to start with context-free baseline experiments (like the 2 x 2 
results described earlier) and then experiment incrementally with contex-
tual changes (like one- and two-way communication). Further changes of 
organizational interest can be added easily. 
8.7 Conclusion 
We began the chapter by pointing out three kinds of coordination problems 
in firms. Matching problems occur when players agree on what is the best 
outcome for the organization (and for themselves) but, for one reason or 
another, cannot necessarily achieve it. Mixed-motive bargaining problems 
occur when players would like to strike some mutually agreeable deal 
(rather than cause an impasse) but different players prefer different deals. 
Assurance problems occur when players agree on what is best but actions 
that lead to the best outcome are riskier, so players want to take them only 
if others probably will as well. 
We then introduced a simple class of games from noncooperative game 
theory, known as coordination games, which precisely operationalize these 
three coordination problems. We contrasted these games with the PO and 
argued that the conditions for true POs are rarely met in actual organiza-
tions; instead, those games are coordination games. 
Next, we elaborated on the point that the application of simple coordina-
tion games to organizational coordination problems focuses attention on 
mechanisms that transform expectations rather than mechanisms that 
transform preferences. We refer to such expectations as organizational expec-
tations, which are loosely defined as the mutual beliefs by all members of an 
organization that all members will follow a particular rule or nOrm. We 
argued that this mutual-belief condition is at the foundation of organiza-
tional rules and norms. Hence, understanding the factors that govern the 
structure and development of mutual beliefs will provide important in-
sights into organizational rules and norms. 
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We concluded by describing experimental research on coordination 
games, which represents the first steps in examining the behavioral under-
pinnings of organizational expectations. This experimental research docu-
ments that risky coordination does indeed lead to inefficient behavior. In 
other words, despite the simplicity of these games, subjects are not able to 
intuit (or are unwilling to bet that others have intuited) the rule of efficient 
play. Each subject understands that 7 in the weakest-link game is the right 
action, but they are not sufficiently confident that all other subjects under-
stand this too. We are presently exploring the impact of many variants of 
this game. Our goal is to understand the conditions necessary for such a 
rule provision in order to create the mutual knowledge required to select 
the efficient equilibrium. We also highlighted experimental research that documented strong pre-
cedent effects across trials of the same coordination game, as well as trans-
fer of precedents from coordination games to PD games. We see these 
results as first steps in using these simple coordinations games to examine 
the development and transfer of organizational rules and norms. 
Our most basic claim is that game theory is useful as a system for 
classifying organizational situations, analyzing how people might behave 
in them, and making clear predictions that can be tested experimentally or, 
with more work, in the field. Indeed, it is hard to think of a decision a 
person makes inside an organization that is not a strategy in a game (in the 
sense that the choices others make at the same time affect the payoff from a 
certain decision). In future work, we hope to apply the PD_coordination distinction to 
highlight the difference between a coordination perspective and the Wil-
liamsonian theory of the firm, which focuses on "holdup" problems that 
are eliminated by integration. We also think that some anomalous features 
of faddish business practices (like total quality management and reen-
gineering) can be thought of as solutions to the problem of coordinating 
organizational change (see Camerer & Knez, in press). 
Notes 
1 This example does not require aversion to effort or shirking. A BOS results if 
they both prefer to deliver the order, either for sheer pleasure, to impress a 
supervisor, or in the expectation of being tipped well. 
2 Our discussion is a simplification of mutual knowledge. Aumann and Branden-
burger (1995) show that the two necessary conditions for the existence of a pure 
strategy Nash equilibrium are mutual knowledge of beliefs and mutual knowl-
edge of rationality. Mutual knowledge of beliefs means that each player knows the 
other player's beliefs. Mutual knowledge of rationality means that each player 
knows that the other player selects the action that maximizes her expected 
payoff given her beliefs. We focus on the mutual knowledge of beliefs condi-
tions, and for simplicity we refer to it as the mutual knowledge condition. 
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3 A1n out~ome !s Pareto efficient if there is no alternative outcome for which one 
payer IS ma e better off without making another pia er worse off Th 
notable example is cooperation in the PD. But note tha{althou h coo' era~:o.st 
tehe (smgle-play) PD is Pareto efficient, it is not a Nash equili~riU p n m 
4 obb-Douglas producti n fu ti m. lab . t 1 ..0 ne ans, commonly used in econometric studies of 
Co.:-capl a productiVIty; exhibit this property for extreme parameter values. 
+ .os (1993) ~h~/:"s that If q, are n separate inputs, the function Q ~ a[(lIn)(q v ~ +. '.' q,,)] exhibIts preasely the weakest-link structure as v grows lar~e 
an negative, and mcludes other interesting structures I . . ~s:e~~~' a~o Hir
d
' shleifer 1983). Jacobs (1981) presents a S~~i~I~~r:,':tI;i:~::':,~ 
. .- In ~ro uction m organizations. 
5 Restncting actions to picking numbers seems highly artificial. But the numbers 
a;e not essential; they are simply used to label equilibrium outcomes from best 
~a~k e~~ryone) to worst. Any set of nonnumerical choices that yields Pareto-
~~:J~t~1:1~f.~!:;~?~~;! ~SS~r~~g:~~:£~~~~~~~::~k!u;~;1?a~ 
makin I • meum ent managers allocate scarce resources and ener to 
ers wilt ~~:r;:,~tu~ng A work. And suppose they prefer to do so if other ma~ag-
. .' y 0 not want to mvest m C, say, if some other mana er will oni :~vest m E. Then they playa weakest-link game that is formally e~uivalent t~ 
b 
etgame we study. The actions are numbered just to denote which methods are 
es. 
6 Hypersensitivity to communication raises an important methodolo' 1 -
cern: Because communicating with members is one thing most or !~a~Z:s 
can do well, why study a class of problems that would be so easily sofved by real 
organ~za~ons through communication? Our answer is that we think enuine 
coordmation problems involve some combination of other features deli~eratel 
left o~t of our experiments, that make coordination difficult even ~ith cornm.1: 
mcation. For example, effective communication may have to be public and w· th 
rr;ost membe;s present. Also, large coordination problems with th;usands 
1 
of 
;;,:ye~s, :r high-stakes problems where the penalty from mismatch is severe, 
y e arder t~ ~~lve wIth limited communication. Finally, the same criticism 
b
about hypersensItiVIty to communication can be leveled at many studies of PDs 
ecause we know that some kinds f ..' I stantially (Sally, 1995). 0 commurucatiOn nnprove cooperation sub-
7 Here we have i,,: mind the kinds of experiments conducted by s cholo . sts :~~:ely to ~e;.~erestled in coordination, namely, social psychofo~sts. of her 
sh w?r 1 erent y. Perceptual and cognitive psychology for example 
use ~uc sImI pIer stir.nuli to get at basic cognitive processes and resemble th~ 
expenmenta economICS style. 
8 Preferences and beliefs about pedaling could be measured inde endentl of the 
b
assfurance task, but that might require inefficiently discardin: many [ubj'ects 
e ore recrUIting enough who r t t . could b a e no 00 exerCIse crazy or averse. Or beliefs 
decepti:n ~:~t~~ ~~ouf~ t;e use 0hf deception or confederate subjects, but 
. . Jec e 0 on ot er grounds (see Camerer in press) For e:~'Ze, If the behefs being induced - say, that Californian subjects do noi like 
;hrou g too m.uch - are unlikely to arise naturally and so must be induced 
gh deception, then one must wonder whether subjects believe the decep-
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tion. Experimental economists also worry about long-run harm to experimenter 
credibility from repeated deception. 
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